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THE DANGEROUS FANTASY OF LINCOLN: FRAMING 
EXECUTIVE POWER AS PRESIDENTIAL MASTERY 
JULIE NOVKOV∗ 
 A wave of surprise and delight swept the star-studded room as the 
silver-haired man with the winning smile strode to the microphone at the 
2013 Golden Globe awards.  After the tumultuous standing ovation, former 
President Bill Clinton introduced Steven Spielberg’s Lincoln,1 which would 
net Daniel Day-Lewis a best actor award before the night was over:2 
 President Lincoln’s struggle to abolish slavery reminds us that 
enduring progress is forged in a cauldron of both principle and 
compromise.  This brilliant film shows us how he did it and gives 
us hope that we can do it again.  In “Lincoln,” we see a man more 
interesting than the legend, and a far better guide for future presi-
dents.  Every hard-fought effort to perfect our union has demand-
ed the same, sane combination of steely resolve and necessary 
compromises that Lincoln mastered to preserve the union and end 
slavery.3 
Clinton’s introduction simultaneously resisted Lincoln the “legend” 
while resituating him as a primary agent: a masterful politician who both 
saved the union and ended slavery.4  This was no anomaly.  The movie 
went on to garner multiple nominations for Academy Awards, and Day-
Lewis was honored with an Oscar for Best Actor.5 
                                                          
Copyright © 2013 by Julie Novkov. 
∗ University at Albany, SUNY.  Many thanks to the participants in the 2013 Schmooze, 
whose enthusiastic responses and thoughtful insights improved this article significantly.  The au-
thor also thanks teenagers Asher Novkov-Bloom and Jarod Croteau, who opted to go watch Lin-
coln with her, enjoyed the movie, and tolerated with aplomb and good humor her hissed commen-
tary throughout.  
 1.  LINCOLN (DreamWorks Studios 2012); Aly Weisman, Bill Clinton Presents ‘Lincoln’ 
During Surprise Golden Globes Appearance, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2013, 11:01 PM), 
available at http://www.businessinsider.com/bill-clinton-makes-suprise-appearance-at-golden-
globes-for-lincoln-2013-1. 
 2.  See infra note 5. 
 3.  The 70th Annual Golden Globe Awards (NBC television broadcast Jan. 13, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NCrlq34caJE. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Jill Serjeant, Daniel Day-Lewis Wins Record Third Best Actor Oscar, REUTERS, Feb. 25, 
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/25/us-oscars-bestactor-
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The 2012 release of Lincoln raises anew questions about what it means 
for American presidents to claim the mantle of the first Republican presi-
dent and the Great Emancipator.  Historians have weighed in to challenge 
the narrative presented by the film, noting particularly the omission of the 
work that abolitionists, both black and white, did to advance the cause of 
emancipation, about which Lincoln was decidedly ambivalent.6  The point 
of this Article is not to pick apart the historical elisions or participate in the 
debate over how emancipation happened (to lay my cards on the table, I be-
lieve that Eric Foner is right), but rather to think about the cultural salience 
of Lincoln—the movie and the president—in contemporary presidential 
politics and rhetoric. 
Another striking moment invoking the sixteenth president took place 
in 2003, when President George W. Bush stood on the deck of an aircraft 
carrier under a large banner that read “Mission Accomplished.”7  President 
Bush had just become the first sitting American president to land on an air-
craft carrier in a fixed wing aircraft, and, aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lin-
coln, declared that combat operations in Iraq had been completed.8  While 
he did not speak about Lincoln directly, he portrayed the war in Iraq as an 
example of America’s commitment to “the cause of liberty,” and celebrated 
the military intervention as an extension of American investment in free-
dom at home and throughout the world.9  The mission accomplished was 
not merely the end of combat operations in Iraq, by President Bush’s ac-
count, but it also entailed the benevolent liberation of the Iraqi people from 
the tyranny of President Saddam Hussein.10 
The image of an American president displaying American triumphal 
military might on a vessel named for Abraham Lincoln was controversial, 
primarily because it soon became clear that the mission, however it was de-
fined, was not “accomplished.”11  President George W. Bush’s critics con-
tinued to question both his conduct of the war in Iraq and his decision to 
                                                          
idUSBRE91O05V20130225; Todd Leopold, ‘Lincoln’ Leads Oscar Race with 12 Nominations, 
CNN.COM, Jan. 10, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/10/showbiz/movies/oscar-nominations. 
 6.  For a scathing response to David Brooks’ laudatory editorial about Lincoln’s political 
wizardry see Eric Foner, Letter to the Editor, Lincoln’s Use of Politics for Noble Ends, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2012, at A30. 
 7.  Commander-in-Chief Lands on U.S.S. Lincoln, CNN.COM, May 2, 2003, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/05/01/bush.carrier.landing/. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq from the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln (May 
1, 2003), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68675. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Sean Loughlin, One Year Later, Bush Defends Iraq Speech, CNN.COM, Apr. 30, 2004, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/04/30/speech.anniversary/. 
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initiate military operations there in the first place, given the unfinished 
business with the Taliban and al Qaeda.12  The question not asked, however, 
was whether President Bush was properly invoking Lincoln—or more fun-
damentally what it meant to invoke him. 
In recent years, invoking Lincoln has been a troubling political ma-
neuver in significant ways that the movie Lincoln highlights.  Calls out to 
Lincoln by presidents and their political interlocutors (including the media) 
tend to take on two forms: either the president or interlocutor is claiming 
the mantle of Lincoln and calling attention, implicitly or explicitly, to his 
own Lincolnesque behavior, or a critic of the president is claiming that the 
president’s behavior or rhetoric is not, in fact, Lincolnesque.13  In either 
scenario, what is Lincolnesque is normatively good—an example of effec-
tive leadership in a context of crisis.  The Lincolnesque president is one be-
set by conflict and turmoil, both in internal political circles and in the sur-
rounding atmosphere, which is one of grave threat to the nation.  He 
responds by managing the turmoil effectively, shouldering the burdens of 
leadership and bearing them with grace, self-deprecating humor, and ruth-
less pursuit of ultimate success.  The Lincolnesque president is also one 
who promotes a narrow vision of racial equality properly centered between 
extremes of overt racism on the one hand and illegitimate racial reparations 
on the other.14 
Lincoln was broadly released in the United States on November 9, 
2012, three days after President Barack Obama was re-elected.15  The mov-
ie focuses intensely on President Lincoln’s involvement in the political 
struggle over the Thirteenth Amendment in the House of Representatives as 
the Civil War was moving toward its conclusion.16  The movie thus delves 
deeply into the complex intra-party politics of the Republicans as well as 
the Democrats’ struggles to reassert authority after their drubbing in the 
election of 1864 (as the movie underlines, the Democrats lost fifty seats).17  
President Lincoln is portrayed in three roles: as a masterful politician, as a 
                                                          
 12.  Id. 
 13.  See infra Parts I–II. 
 14.  See supra text accompanying notes 3–4.  
 15.  Christopher Rosen, ‘Lincoln’ Release Date: Steven Spielberg’s Latest Placed in Oscar 
Season, HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 18, 2012, 6:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2012/07/18/lincoln-release-date-steven-spielberg_n_1684377.html; Jeff Zeleny & Jim Rutenberg, 
Divided U.S. Gives Obama More Time, N.Y. TIMES Nov. 6, 2012, at A1.  
 16.  LINCOLN, supra note 1. 
 17.  Id.  While the movie highlights the vast political gulf between the radical and conserva-
tive Republicans, it does not address the split between the Copperheads and War Democrats that 
contributed to the Democrats’ poor electoral performance.  
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loving father, and as a husband in a troubled marriage.18  In each of these 
roles, he balances his compassion and commitment to his values with his 
pragmatic negotiation of difficult situations to achieve desired outcomes.19  
The audience is encouraged to sympathize with the extraordinarily difficult 
circumstances he faces and to appreciate the grace and humor he employs 
as he achieves success.20  The movie honestly acknowledges President Lin-
coln’s moderate stances on black rights and Reconstruction, but downplays 
these issues in favor of presenting the man himself as a foresighted and 
wise leader who wants (and maneuvers to achieve) particular political re-
sults for deeply moral reasons.21 
One critical scene in the movie features President Lincoln discussing 
with his advisors the reasons for pressing the Thirteenth Amendment for-
ward at this historical moment.22  His advisors are wrangling over whether 
it is worth the effort and political capital to pursue the Amendment, given 
that the war is moving toward conclusion.23  President Lincoln interrupts 
the bickering to situate himself as a leader: “I decided that the Constitution 
gives me war powers, but no one knows just exactly what those powers are.  
Some say they don’t exist.  I don’t know.  I decided I needed them to exist 
to uphold my oath to protect the Constitution . . . .”24  Lincoln, and he 
alone, was the interpreter of war powers and seized them, using his oath to 
uphold the Constitution as a bootstrap.25  He then determined that his war 
powers enabled him to seize slaves and consider them confiscated property 
(a determination that historically was made first by his generals and to 
which he only reluctantly acceded to after a time).26 
This left Lincoln in a further conundrum, however, because of his 
maintenance of the argument that the South was not a nation.27  How could 
he continue to insist that the South was merely a pack of individual rebels, 
that the southern states themselves were not in revolt, much less in seces-
sion, while simultaneously justifying the effective abrogation of states’ laws 
                                                          
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Lincoln Quotes, IMDB [hereinafter Quotes] http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0443272/quotes 
(last visited July 14, 2013). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Sean Wilentz, Congress Confiscates Confederates’ Slaves, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (July 16, 
2012, 8:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/congress-confiscates-
confederates-slaves/.  
 27.  Quotes, supra note 24. 
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concerning slavery?  Despite the contradiction, Lincoln continues, “Negroes 
in those states are slaves, hence property, hence my war powers allow me to 
confiscate ‘em as such.  So I confiscated ‘em.”28  What enables him to can-
cel state laws in this fashion?  Lincoln explained: “I felt the war demanded 
it; my oath demanded it; I felt right with myself; and I hoped it was legal to 
do it, I’m hoping still.  Two years ago I proclaimed these people emancipat-
ed—‘then, hence forward and forever free.’”29  The Gordian knot has been 
slashed by the necessities of war, and the sword Lincoln wields is his oath 
of office. 
Why then the need for the Thirteenth Amendment if war powers could 
be used to justify emancipation? Lincoln explains: 
 But let’s say the courts decide I had no authority to do it.  They 
might well decide that.  Say there’s no amendment abolishing 
slavery.  Say it’s after the war, and I can no longer use my war 
powers to just ignore the courts’ decisions, like I sometimes felt I 
had to do.  Might those people I freed be ordered back into slav-
ery?  That’s why I’d like to get the Thirteenth Amendment 
through the House, and on its way to ratification by the states, 
wrap the whole slavery thing up, forever and aye.  As soon as I’m 
able.  Now.  End of this month.  And I’d like you to stand behind 
me.  Like my cabinet’s most always done.30 
The danger Lincoln foresees is that emancipation will not be seen as a 
permanent act.31  It could be interpreted as producing only a temporary le-
gal status subject to change once the power behind the Proclamation evapo-
rates with the cessation of hostilities.32  He expresses concern about how the 
courts will handle these questions in the wake of the war’s end, and uncer-
tainty that emancipation will stick.33 
The answer to this problem, he asserts, is rapid action on the Thir-
teenth Amendment.34  Implied underneath the speech, read into it by the 
audience’s presumed collective knowledge of Lincoln as the emancipator, is 
an understanding that he is pressing forward to secure emancipation for 
                                                          
 28.  Quotes, supra note 24.  In this speech, screenplay writer Kushner avoids mentioning 
Dred Scott, the legal basis for Lincoln’s surety that states retain the right to defend slavery and 
define slaves as property; Dred Scott has become something of a dog whistle for anti-abortion op-
ponents of Roe v. Wade.  Colleen McCain Nelson, Did Bush Link Abortion, Dred Scott Refer-
ence?,  DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 13, 2004, at 10A.  
 29.  Quotes, supra note 24. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
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fundamentally moral reasons; pragmatic motivations play no role in his dis-
cussion either of the Emancipation Proclamation or of the significance of 
emancipation generally.35  Convinced, his advisors cease their bickering 
and prepare to move forward together to muster the necessary votes to pass 
the amendment in the House.36 
The key moment in the speech, however, is in Lincoln’s simultaneous 
justification of his occasional circumvention or defiance of the law coupled 
with his implied acknowledgement that only the war justifies these acts, and 
that this justification will expire with the cessation of hostilities.37  This crit-
ical speech presents two fundamental arguments of the movie about Lincoln 
and about politics. 
The first argument is that Lincoln is great and admirable because he is 
both driven by a fundamental moral compass and because he is capable of 
acting pragmatically to true his aim.  (In fact, one scene between Lincoln 
and Representative Thaddeus Stevens invokes the compass image, with 
Lincoln praising Stevens’s compass’s unwavering point to true north but 
pointing out that it cannot help to navigate the swamps that lie in the 
way).38  Lincoln does face moral dilemmas, but we know that his resolution 
of them—choosing to press for the Thirteenth Amendment rather than ne-
gotiating an end to the war with slavery as a bargaining chip, and finally re-
alizing that he must heartlessly press Mary Todd Lincoln into allowing their 
oldest son to go to war39—are the morally better choices.  In making these 
choices, he stands forth among advisors and opponents (and Mary Todd 
Lincoln) who act as foils. 
The second fundamental argument of the movie is highlighted by Lin-
coln’s posture toward the law, buried toward the end of his self-described 
“sermon.”  His war powers render him simultaneously a lawmaker, ena-
bling him to justify the Emancipation Proclamation as a legal act (both in 
terms of invoking law and being permissible under the law), and a creature 
above the law itself, with the power to exercise his discretion to determine 
when he “has to” ignore the rulings of the courts.40 
Here and throughout the movie, the fundamental rightness of his ulti-
mate choices acts to justify the means he employs—that he must employ—
                                                          
 35.  Id. 
 36.  LINCOLN, supra note 1. 
 37.  Quotes, supra note 24. 
 38.  LINCOLN, supra note 1. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Quotes, supra note 24. 
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to achieve them.41  Lincoln starts by discussing the necessity for obtaining 
twenty additional votes for the Amendment with his skeptical Secretary of 
State William Seward (played to perfection by David Straithaim).42  Seward 
is eventually convinced that these votes must be obtained by any means 
necessary and unhappily shoulders the unsavory task of working with polit-
ical operatives to distribute promises of spoils positions to defeated Demo-
crats to secure their votes.43  Ultimately, Lincoln himself must contribute to 
this effort, though he is portrayed only as using moral suasion to sway wa-
vering members of Congress.44  More of a grey area, however, is his prom-
ise to conservative Republican Francis Blair to meet with Confederate dele-
gates to discuss peace, a promise that he fails to mention and about which 
he misdirects, and ultimately lies, to prevent angering the radical Republi-
cans and several members of his own cabinet.45  To add insult to injury, 
Lincoln consciously chooses to double-cross the Confederate commission-
ers by deciding, in a dramatic scene late at night with only his two telegra-
phers as witnesses, to delay the commissioners and prevent their entry into 
the District of Columbia prior to the vote on the Amendment.46  Lincoln 
breaks a lot of eggs to prepare his omelet as the audience nods approvingly 
at his audacity and capacity to, as Mary Todd Lincoln notes, pick his way 
carefully through the treacherous swamp of politics better than any other 
living man.47 
Of course, by 1865, the real Lincoln had engaged in many more con-
troversial and constitutionally questionable acts.48  He had suspended habe-
as corpus independently, only gaining congressional approval post hoc.49  
He had cracked down on free speech vigorously to stem anti-enlistment and 
anti-draft fervor, targeting newspaper editors in particular.50  And he had 
imposed martial law in areas far from combat.51  A few of these issues are 
raised in the movie, but only by being placed as hyperbolic charges in the 
mouths of unsympathetic and racist opponents to the Thirteenth Amend-
                                                          
 41.  LINCOLN, supra note 1. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Debora K. Kristensen, Finding the Right Balance: American Civil Liberties in Time of 
War, ADVOCATE, Dec. 2001, at 20–21. 
 49.  Jonathan Hafetz, A Different View of the Law: Habeas Corpus During the Lincoln and 
Bush Presidencies, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 439, 444–45 (2009). 
 50.  Kristensen, supra note 48, at 20. 
 51.  Id. 
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ment.52  (The one time Spielberg’s Lincoln addresses his own policy of im-
posing the death penalty on deserters, it is to puzzle briefly over, and then 
grant, a pardon request for a sixteen-year old boy.)53 
For a movie so deeply steeped in politics and partisanship, Lincoln was 
received in an oddly apolitical fashion.  Its liberal (in modern terms, read 
Democratic) credentials were impeccable: Director Steven Spielberg has 
supported the Democratic Party and counts former President Bill Clinton 
among his friends,54 and screenplay author Tony Kushner is best known for 
his Tony-winning play about the AIDS epidemic, Angels in America.55  Yet 
modern Republicans continue to invoke themselves as the party of Lincoln 
and the Democrats in the movie are portrayed as racist, venal, or both.56  
The movie garnered praise from a wide variety of critics, earning an eighty-
nine percent fresh rating from Rotten Tomatoes.57  As noted above, David 
Brooks waxed rhapsodic about Lincoln’s message, lauding it as a celebra-
tion of politics and the good that can be achieved by skilled political actors, 
and urging people to see the movie to regain their faith in the political pro-
cess despite its warts.58  The more liberal Ruth Marcus opined that Con-
gress itself should be invited to a special screening.59  Why does a movie 
that celebrates Lincoln and emancipation while highlighting the corruption 
and nastiness of politics not simply get read as more Hollywood liberalism?  
And why this portrait of Abraham Lincoln now, a portrait that has obvious-
ly tapped into something deeply salient in American culture and politics?60 
                                                          
 52.  LINCOLN, supra note 1. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See Weisman, supra note 1; Adam Wollner, House Committee Considers Online Ad Dis-
closure, Tweeting Donations and More in Capital Eye-Opener, STATES NEWS SERV, June 20, 
2012, available at http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/06/620-capital-eye-opener.html. 
 55.  Aileen Jacobsen, Why a Braodway Hit Soars: The Scriptures For ‘Angels In America’, 
NEWSDAY, June 11, 1993, at Part II Weekend. 
 56.  LINCOLN, supra note 1.  One of the few moments of comic relief comes when Thaddeus 
Stevens invites to his office a Democratic House member seeking assistance in retaining his seat 
after a contested election.  Id.  Stevens’s task is to convince the Democrat to vote for the amend-
ment in exchange for Stevens’s support.  Id.  Stevens sourly questions him: “You are a Democrat.  
What’s the matter with you?  Are you wicked?” Quotes, supra note 24. 
 57.  Lincoln (2012), ROTTEN TOMATOES, http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/lincoln_2011/ 
(last visited July 16, 2013). 
 58.  David Brooks, Op-Ed., Why We Love Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2012, at A35. 
 59.  Ruth Marcus, Commentary, Congress Should See the Movie Lincoln, STAR TRIBUNE, 
Nov. 25, 2012, http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentaries 
/180442191.html?refer=y. 
 60.  I can recall only a few other movies about politics and about congressional politics in 
particular that had this kind of cultural resonance, and these—for example, Mr. Smith Goes to 
Washington and Advise and Consent—date back to 1939 and 1962 respectively.  MR. SMITH 
GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures 1939); ADVISE AND CONSENT (Columbia Pictures 
1962).  
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To answer these questions, I turn to the presidencies of George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama.  Lincoln the movie, I argue, is a reflection of 
Bush’s presidency and a frame for Obama’s.  Both men have portrayed 
themselves as leading the nation through parlous times and situated them-
selves (or attempted to do so) as strong leaders whose primary goal is to 
protect and preserve national security.61  In doing so, they have both on oc-
casion donned Lincoln’s mantle or had it placed on their shoulders, looking 
to make difficult and painful choices with bloody consequences but justify-
ing these choices by invoking the Executive’s duty to the nation.  And both 
men have employed the Lincoln maneuver of using war powers to situate 
themselves as lawmakers and persons above the law.62 
I.  CASTING GEORGE W. BUSH AS ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
President George W. Bush, unlike President Lincoln, was not elected 
in a moment of national crisis.  While upper echelon security experts knew 
of the threat of al Qaeda, the nation voting for President Bush and watching 
his inauguration did not see the threat of imminent war on the horizon.  Af-
ter September 11th, though, President Bush had to find his feet immediately 
as a wartime commander in chief.  Throughout his presidency, he and those 
around him turned to Lincoln for inspiration.63 
In his State of the Union address in 2006, President Bush situated him-
self as a hero refusing the easy path: 
 Fellow citizens, we’ve been called to leadership in a period of 
consequence.  We’ve entered a great ideological conflict we did 
nothing to invite. . . .  Sometimes it can seem that history is turn-
ing in a wide arc toward an unknown shore.  Yet the destination 
of history is determined by human action, and every great move-
ment of history comes to a point of choosing.  Lincoln could have 
accepted peace at the cost of disunity and continued slavery. . . .  
Today, having come far in our own historical journey, we must 
decide: Will we turn back or finish well?64 
The unspoken easy path President Bush was rejecting was also a path 
of peace along with appeasement of an evil enemy—in his case, the perpe-
trators of the “great ideological conflict” the United States had not invited.65  
He presented himself as determined to stay the course, an image reinforced 
                                                          
 61.  See infra Parts I–II. 
 62.  See infra Parts I–II. 
 63.  See infra text accompanying note 64. 
 64.  George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Un-
ion, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 145, 152 (Jan. 31, 2006). 
 65.  Id. 
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by some conservative columnists who portrayed him as a steadfast adherent 
to a challenging, but correct, path.66 
As his second term drew nearer to its close, President Bush made a 
point of highlighting his interest in Lincoln.  He talked about reading biog-
raphies of Lincoln, and at one point, together, he and Karl Rove apparently 
read Doris Kearns Goodwin’s Team of Rivals,67 the main source for Kush-
ner’s Lincoln screenplay.68  In his final news conference, he repeated the 
by-then well-established theme of how Lincoln had been an inspiration for 
him in his refusal to bow down before public criticism and hostility.69  He 
noted the hostility and anger that his critics had expressed toward him, but 
stated that: 
 It’s not the first time, however, in history that people have ex-
pressed themselves in sometimes undignified ways.  I’ve been 
reading, you know, a lot about Abraham Lincoln during my Pres-
idency, and there was some pretty harsh discord when it came to 
the 16th President, just like there’s been harsh discord for the 
30[th]—43d President.70 
He then likened himself to Lincoln as a President who did not avoid 
controversy by failing to make hard decisions: 
 That’s just not my nature.  I’m the kind of person that, you 
know, is willing to take on hard tasks, and in times of war people 
get emotional; I understand that.  Never really, you know, spent 
that much time, frankly, worrying about the loud voices.  I, of 
course, hear them, but they didn’t affect my policy, nor did they 
affect how I made decisions.71 
In this statement, by invoking Lincoln and Lincoln’s war, President Bush 
presented Lincoln as a President who had made hard and controversial, but 
ultimately right, decisions during wartime.  He then paralleled his own ex-
periences to Lincoln’s, both in terms of refusing to respond to criticisms ei-
ther of his substantive policy positions or his decisionmaking processes. 
                                                          
 66.  See, e.g., Newt Gingrich, Bush and Lincoln, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2006, at 7, available at 
http://extendedremarks.blogspot.com/2007/08/newt-gingrich-on-lincoln-and-bush.html (compar-
ing the difficulties President Bush faced with the war on terrorism to those President Lincoln 
faced in the Civil War and affirming  President Bush’s decisions). 
 67.  DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN (2005). 
 68.  Karl Rove, Op-Ed., Bush Is a Book Lover, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123025595706634689.html. 
 69.  George W. Bush, The President’s News Conference, 45 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 55 
(Jan. 12, 2009).   
 70.  Id. at 59. 
 71.  Id. 
 64 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:54 
He was almost certainly thinking of his handling of the military con-
flicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and perhaps specifically of the firestorm of 
criticism that engulfed his handling of individuals he termed enemy com-
batants.72  Many books and articles have considered the legalities and ille-
galities of the Guantánamo Bay detention facility, the use of evidence elic-
ited by torture in quasi-legal proceedings, and the President’s fudging of 
civil liberties issues during the military engagements.73  The issue on which 
this discussion will concentrate is the Bush Administration’s handling of 
detainees and attempts to articulate and justify policies regarding them.  The 
point is not so much to add any new insights to the debate over the legali-
ties, but rather to show how the Bush Administration’s actions keyed pretty 
consciously on a Lincolnian framework, thereby setting up a debate over 
whether President Bush resembled the masterful political genius he was in-
voking. 
From near the beginning of the United States’ military engagement in 
Afghanistan, the Bush Administration portrayed the conflict as unprece-
dented and as posing an existential threat to the nation. He pressed the view 
that the executive branch had broad plenary powers available not only to 
prosecute the war, but also to make determinations about the thorny legal 
issues it raised.  This stance is evident in Jay Bybee’s memo of January 
2002, where he declares that “Article II of the Constitution makes clear that 
the President is vested with all of the federal executive power . . . .”74  
While he acknowledges that Congress “possesses its own specific foreign 
affairs powers,” the Article II grant provides “an undefined executive pow-
er” and Article I’s grant to Congress is “limited.”75  Therefore, he asserts, 
“[f]rom the very beginnings of the Republic, this constitutional arrangement 
has been understood to grant the President plenary control over the conduct 
                                                          
 72.  See, e.g., William Glaberson, U.S. Won’t Label Terror Suspects as ‘Combatants,’ N.Y. 
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of foreign relations,” including the capacity to make legal determinations 
about treaty status and the appropriate treatment of captured individuals.76 
This general belief grounded specific findings among the President’s 
legal staff and officers in the Departments of Justice and Defense that the 
executive branch had the power to determine that detainees captured in the 
war were not prisoners of war subject to the protections of the Geneva Con-
ventions,77 to establish military commissions outside of the normal proce-
dures of court martials to determine the fate of detainees,78 to authorize tor-
ture to obtain information from detainees,79 and to set up a system for 
continuing detention and interrogation of detainees,80 among other things.  
All of these actions reinforced the idea that what the Administration was 
calling the War on Terror was a unique war against a unique kind of enemy, 
and that only the executive branch had the capacity and authority to respond 
appropriately. 
President Bush understood himself to face a challenge not unlike Lin-
coln’s.81  Where Lincoln was in the difficult position of prosecuting a war 
that could not be declared a war because he could not acknowledge seces-
sion, Bush was prosecuting a war against a non-state enemy.  Both had a 
need to define and understand their respective military conflicts in terms of 
war because both relied on the legal frame of war as an existential threat to 
the nation to leverage the vast expansion of executive authority contemplat-
ed in their orders and those of their subordinates.82  Yet both faced political 
and legal imperatives not to define the conflicts as war.  In Lincoln’s case, 
to do so would acknowledge secession as legitimate and define the southern 
states (and not just certain individuals in them) as in rebellion.83  In Presi-
dent Bush’s case, to define the conflict as a traditional war would afford the 
Geneva Convention’s legal protections to the detainees, trigger greater col-
laborative responsibilities with Congress, and imply significant limits in the 
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extent to which the pursuit of al Qaeda could cross national borders or inter-
fere with other sovereign nations.84 
President Bush thus reprised Lincoln’s triumph of will.  The military 
conflict was a War on Terror without a declaration of war against another 
sovereign nation;85 it involved massive deployments of American troops 
and the building of an international military coalition to engage in what al-
most any sane observer would identify as acts of war.  Yet President Bush 
persisted in defining the war as unique in the nature of the combatants and 
in the threat it posed to the United States, using these claims to leverage his 
insistence that the executive branch alone had the authority to craft legal 
principles to govern the engagements.86  Lincoln’s words from Kushner’s 
script—”I felt the war demanded it; my oath demanded it; I felt right with 
myself; and I hoped it was legal to do it, I’m hoping still”87—fit easily in 
President Bush’s mouth. 
Even President Bush’s troubled relationship with the Supreme Court 
can fit into the Lincoln frame.  The Justices were not impressed with his ef-
forts to sort out the legalities of the war, and challenges to the military tri-
bunals led to a series of rulings that repeatedly demanded that President 
Bush collaborate with Congress and afford a standard and internationally 
recognized set of due process protections to the detainees.88  The detainee 
cases were hailed by liberal commentators as reinforcing the rule of law and 
drawing the line at an extreme interpretation of the unitary executive.89  Yet 
just as Justice Taney’s stern rebuke to Lincoln in Ex Parte Merryman90 had 
no effect on Merryman’s status, the rulings had a very limited concrete ef-
fect on the situation in Guantánamo Bay despite their bold rhetoric.91 
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As but one example of his efforts to assert mastery, consider the sign-
ing statement President Bush issued in validating funding for the Detainee 
Treatment Act (“DTA”) of 2005:92 
 The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of 
the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the 
constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary 
executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with 
the constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which will as-
sist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the 
President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American peo-
ple from further terrorist attacks.93 
In this remarkable statement, the President asserts his authority to su-
pervise a unitary executive branch on the basis of his war powers and ar-
gues that the courts are limited in their capacity to challenge his actions.94  
The justification is the purpose of the President’s policy (purportedly legit-
imized by Congress in the DTA) of protecting against terrorism.95  Note 
particularly that he invokes terrorist attacks rather than acts of war, thereby 
expanding and rendering even more vague his own grant of authority as a 
war leader.96  The statement then instructs the courts that the executive 
branch “shall construe” the act to deny subject matter jurisdiction “over any 
existing or future action, including applications for writs of habeas cor-
pus.”97  This action, of course, echoes Lincoln’s suspensions of habeas, 
which were only critically addressed by the Supreme Court after the war 
had ended and he had been assassinated.98 
Finally, the Bush Administration’s argument for broad and unbounded 
executive authority based on emergency played a central role in a Depart-
ment of Justice memorandum from 2006 supporting warrantless wiretap-
ping by the National Security Agency (“NSA”).99  The document opened 
with a straightforward enough claim that the President’s powers were at 
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their maximum level under the Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer100 
framework due to the September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (“AUMF”).101  It then went on to claim, breathtakingly, that allowing 
the courts to interpret the existing statutory framework for wiretapping to 
bar the NSA from taking matters into its own hands would be unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the President’s duty to protect the nation: 
 Indeed, were FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] and 
Title III interpreted to impede the President’s ability to use the 
traditional tool of electronic surveillance to detect and prevent fu-
ture attacks by a declared enemy that has already struck at the 
homeland and is engaged in ongoing operations against the Unit-
ed States, the constitutionality of FISA, as applied to that situa-
tion, would be called into very serious doubt.  In fact, if this diffi-
cult constitutional question had to be addressed, FISA would be 
unconstitutional as applied to this narrow context.102 
Again, the nature of the emergency justified extraordinary action.103  Inde-
pendent executive interpretation of what was legal was, in this memo’s 
framework, necessary and constitutionally required as a piece of the Execu-
tive’s imperative duty to protect the nation.104 
President Bush’s actions provoked a debate between liberals and con-
servatives over whether he was, or was not, comparable to Lincoln.  Vari-
ous columnists and pundits from David Frum to Newt Gingrich argued for 
the comparison.105  In his documentary on President Bush aired on Fox 
News, Bret Baier argued that President Bush was inspired by Lincoln and 
that their respective presidencies had many similarities.106  University of 
Baltimore Law School professor Garrett Epps was provoked enough to re-
spond acerbically that: 
 George W. Bush is Lincoln the way Dan Quayle is Jack Ken-
nedy. Bush does, however, stack up quite nicely against Andrew 
Johnson, one of the least successful presidents in our history.  
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That’s because, even though Bush has most of Johnson’s flaws, 
he runs almost no risk of being impeached by his own party.107 
II.  BARACK OBAMA TAKES THE STAGE 
But were the comparisons with Lincoln merely a phenomenon of the 
controversial Bush presidency, his embrace of the unitary executive, and his 
own efforts to liken himself to the sixteenth President? Apparently not. 
President Obama’s candidacy and election invited discussion about 
Lincoln due to his race.  However, the relationship between Presidents 
Obama and Lincoln has been more than skin deep, and like his immediate 
predecessor, Obama has courted comparisons to Lincoln and invoked 
him.108  Likewise, President Obama’s supporters and allies have placed 
Lincoln’s mantle on his shoulders.109  Also a son of Illinois, then-Senator 
Obama launched his campaign from the Old Illinois State Capitol in Spring-
field, where Lincoln delivered his “house divided” speech in 1858.110  And 
the turning point of his primary campaign was his Perfect Union speech at 
the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia, which raised interesting 
parallels to Lincoln’s campaign speeches (historian Harold Holzer notes 
particularly the connections to Lincoln’s Cooper Union Address, in which 
Lincoln also invoked constitutional history and situated himself as a racial 
moderate).111  While some of the likening of President Obama to Lincoln is 
cultural, as Ron English’s portrait of Obama as Lincoln illustrates,112 Presi-
dent Obama consciously deployed the parallel as well.  He continued to in-
voke Lincoln in both of his inaugurations, opting to be sworn in using the 
same Bible upon which Lincoln had taken his oath of office.113 
While then-Senator Obama ran his first campaign on a note of hope—
among other hopes, Lincoln’s hope for peace—once in office, he faced the 
same conundrums that had bedeviled his predecessor in the ongoing mili-
tary engagements that sought to address al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.  
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President Obama found it difficult to figure out a way to close down Guan-
tánamo Bay, and he was unable to construct an adequate framework for 
treating the detainees as either accused criminals or prisoners of war.114  
While he did fulfill his campaign promises to draw down troops in Iraq—
and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan—and avoided referring to the War on 
Terror, he made it clear that he had no intentions of ceasing the American 
armed forces’ pursuit of alleged terrorists, and the nation remained in a state 
of war.115 
President Obama began with the stated intention of restoring what 
scholars and pundits critical of former President Bush described as the rule 
of law.  On January 15, 2009, the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) pre-
pared the ground just prior to President Obama’s inauguration by releasing 
a memorandum disavowing a 2001–2003 series of memoranda from the 
OLC “respecting the allocation of authorities between the President and 
Congress in matters of war and national security . . . .”116  While the memo-
randum noted that the OLC had “confronted novel and complex legal ques-
tions in a time of great danger and under extraordinary time pressure,” the 
withdrawn opinions were criticized for not following the ordinary practice 
of the OLC, focusing on broad statements about executive authority rather 
than narrow questions about specific events and scenarios.117  While cynics 
might see the memo simply as an effort to curtail executive power just be-
fore it passed into the hands of a Democratic commander in chief, the 
stance reflected President Obama’s campaign rhetoric, as well as that of 
Democratic critics of the Bush Administration.118  It did not, however, stick. 
                                                          
 114.  See Max Fisher, Why Hasn’t Obama Closed Guantánamo Bay?, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, (APR. 30, 2013, 5:18 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/04/30/obama-just-gave-a-powerful-speech-about-the-need-to-close-
gitmo-so-why-hasnt-he/ (discussing the legal and political hurdles for President Obama to close 
Guantánamo Bay). 
 115.  See The Obamameter: End the War in Afghanistan in 2014, POLITIFACT.COM (Mar. 29, 
2013), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/1096/end-war-
afghanistan-2014/ (noting that Obama has ended the war in Iraq, has drawn down troops, and has 
set a timetable to remove more troops and end the war in Afghanistan by the end of 2014). 
 116. Memorandum from Steven Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Re: Status of 
Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 1 
(Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ 
torturingdemocracy/documents/20090115.pdf. 
 117.  Id. at 1. 
 118.  Compare id. at 1–2 (proscribing a much more limited scope of presidential plenary pow-
er) with Charlie Savage, Barack Obama Q&A, BOSTON.COM (Dec. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/2008/specials/CandidateQA/ObamaQA/ (rejecting plainly 
President Bush’s claim that the President may detain U.S. citizens without charges as enemy com-
batants). 
 2013]     THE DANGEROUS FANTASY OF LINCOLN 71 
Probably the best example of President Obama’s operation within the 
Lincolnian frame is with respect to the former constitutional law professor’s 
attempts to deal with the legalities of killing American citizens suspected of 
terrorism.  Despite the Supreme Court’s resistance to the Bush Administra-
tion’s assertion of unitary executive theories,119 the Obama Administration 
has continued to rely, if less openly, on these theories.  The recently re-
vealed Department of Justice White Paper120 outlines a provocative theory 
of executive power that is consistent both with the Bush Administration’s 
approach and with a heroic Lincoln model of executive power in circum-
stances of crisis and legal uncertainty.121 
The memo introduces the idea as “a legal framework,” though it spe-
cifically disavows any broad intent to establish guidelines for what might 
make any killing of a U.S. citizen acceptable in the conduct of continued 
military and quasi-military engagements.122  The memo limits its applica-
tion to circumstances in which “an informed, high-level official of the U.S. 
government” has found that the individual “poses an imminent threat of 
violent attack against the United States,” where capture of the individual is 
“infeasible,” and where “the operation would be conducted in a manner 
consistent with applicable law of war principles.”123  The memo identifies 
the grounding authority for such actions in a principle of “national self de-
fense,” and while it acknowledges that under due process, individuals have 
an interest in their own lives, “that interest must be balanced against the 
United States’ interest in forestalling the threat of violence and death to 
other Americans.”124 
The memo proceeds from the national right of self-defense to the ex-
ecutive branch quickly.  Beyond the AUMF, the authority for the lawful use 
of force against terrorist forces arises from “the President’s constitutional 
responsibility to protect the nation.”125  The argument thus circles upon it-
self: the President is specifically empowered to make these judgments and 
exercise force lawfully in this fashion because the authority for taking such 
action is rooted in executive power (as well as in a more broadly defined 
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national interest).126  The framework goes a step further, implying that the 
power is not a discretionary option but rather a constitutional responsibility 
of the commander in chief.127 
The memo leverages the unique circumstances of the conflict (framed 
as being against al-Qaeda and its associated forces, the definition of which 
is presumably left to the executive branch).  As it notes, “[t]here is little ju-
dicial or other authoritative precedent that speaks directly to the question of 
the geographic scope of a non-international armed conflict in which one of 
the parties is a transnational, non-state actor and where the principal theater 
of operations is not within the territory of the nation that is a party to the 
conflict.”128  The key issue is that military operations fall under the law of 
war, while actions against domestic, civilian, or citizen suspects fall within 
the purview of the criminal justice system.  The memo wedges open a limi-
nal space between these options on the basis of the President’s constitution-
al obligations to ensure national defense, and the only question remaining is 
“whether and what further restrictions may limit its exercise.”129 
But what, one might ask, of due process?  Where might the courts play 
a role?  While the interests of the targeted individual and the nation are ad-
mittedly “weighty,” the memo proposes a balancing test based on the 1976 
case of Mathews v. Eldridge,130 which David Schultz identifies as “an ad-
ministrative law case that defines when the government must provide hear-
ings to individuals denied Social Security benefits.”131  Under the circum-
stances outlined at the outset of the memo, the balance weighs in favor of 
the government, in the person of the executive branch.132  As the memo ex-
plains, “[t]he ‘realities’ of the conflict and the weight of the government’s 
interest in protecting its citizens from an imminent attack are such that the 
Constitution would not require the government to provide further pro-
cess . . . .”133  The Fourth Amendment also provides no refuge, because ac-
cording to the circumstances defined by the memo, no “appropriate” judi-
cial forum is available for resolution, and any judicial intervention would be 
an improper incursion on the executive authority Congress had authorized 
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(despite any specific involvement of Congress in the development or im-
plementation of this policy).134 
The point about Lincoln here is not the shocking nature of the Obama 
Administration’s admission that it was targeting American citizens, though 
that admission certainly provoked controversy and condemnation.135  Ra-
ther, it is to note the flow of the argument to justify not just executive ac-
tion, but executive lawmaking in the interest of preserving the nation.  Be-
hind the definitions and court cases cited, the memo places exclusive 
responsibility in the executive branch for determining who fits the three 
outlined criteria, when a proposed action under the policy is legitimate, and 
even what organizations and individuals can be understood to be “al-Qa’ida 
or an associated force.”136  The power to make these determinations and to 
implement the policy fall to the executive branch entirely, but the exercise 
of these powers is explicitly described as legal.137  As Spielberg’s Lincoln 
argues, the Obama Administration needs these powers in order for President 
Obama to uphold his oath of office, and to implement national self de-
fense.138  Because the oath of office and the responsibility to defend the na-
tion require swift and sure action, the President must simultaneously hold 
law-making, law-executing, and interpretive powers.  And here again, while 
the claim rests upon the extraordinary nature of the threat to the nation, the 
executive branch, resting upon the thin branch of the AUMF, is the ultimate 
interpreter of the nature of the threat.  In this posture, the Executive is not 
reaching out for power, but rather is constitutionally required to exercise it 
as a specific and constitutional responsibility.  Lincoln, ultimately, had to 
save the nation, just as Presidents Bush and Obama had to protect it. 
The presentation of President Obama as a political master and heir to 
Lincoln’s legacy extends beyond his continuation of the military campaign 
against terrorists and terrorism.  One of President Obama’s favorite tropes 
is to call for greater political consensus and collaboration across party lines 
by endorsing Lincoln’s philosophy of government.  A recent example took 
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place in President Obama’s State of the Union Address.139  After outlining a 
series of items on his domestic agenda, he called for a cooling of political 
passions, stating: 
 We need to end the notion that the two parties must be locked 
in a perpetual campaign of mutual destruction, that politics is 
about clinging to rigid ideologies instead of building consensus 
around commonsense ideas.  I’m a Democrat, but I believe what 
Republican Abraham Lincoln believed: That Government should 
do for people only what they cannot do better by themselves and 
no more.140 
While President Obama cites Lincoln as a Republican, he places a set piece 
of modern Republican ideology in Lincoln’s mouth and then endorses it 
himself. 
And just as President Bush’s conservative supporters drew the paral-
lels, President Obama’s foot soldiers play the same role.  In a speech widely 
commented upon in right-wing media, Obama’s former chief of staff, Chi-
cago mayor Rahm Emanuel praised President Obama’s perspicacity: “in the 
Oval Office, at the end of the day, all you have are your values, your judg-
ment, and your ability to see a clear road where everybody just sees fog.”141  
He then urged his audience to go and see the movie Lincoln to gain a better 
understanding of how a masterful politician can make sense of conflict and 
the need to balance competing equities.142  Emanuel’s remarks referred not 
to President Obama’s foreign policy successes, but rather to his bailout of 
the auto industry in his first term.143  Unsurprisingly, then, many pundits 
framed the key question about President Obama’s second term as he faced 
deep partisan division over whether he could hew to Lincoln’s masterful 
path.144 
Just as the existential threat of the war justified and shored up the con-
ception of Lincoln as a political master, President Obama’s image benefits 
when he can inhabit the master role both domestically and with regard to 
foreign relations.  As President Obama’s second term progresses (and once 
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the Academy Awards are distributed), we can look forward to increased de-
bate over whether or not he resembles Lincoln, with his supporters arguing 
for the parallel and his opponents discounting it by making him look small 
in comparison with the mighty sixteenth President. 
III.  THE NEUTERED THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The core argument of the movie is that Lincoln’s goal—the passage of 
the Thirteenth Amendment—justified and ennobled his political maneuver-
ing. As the political end that granted him the power of mastery he exer-
cised, as well as the legal construct that would legitimize the extralegal 
emancipation of the slaves, the Thirteenth Amendment as it appears in the 
movie is worthy of some attention.  In the film’s narrative, the epic struggle 
centers on the Thirteenth Amendment as a permanent institutionalization of 
the possibly illegal but morally justified act of wartime emancipation.  As 
noted above, Day-Lewis’s Lincoln expresses the moral righteousness of 
emancipation and his desire to ensure that it will survive the imminent end 
of the Civil War.  He worries, however, that as a measure justified by the 
extraordinary powers of necessity, emancipation will be subject to reversal 
or to use as a bargaining chip to regain southern allegiance to the nation 
(and the concept of national unity).145 
Lincoln’s devotion to emancipation is framed as admirable, but Day-
Lewis’s unquestioned stature as the hero of the movie obscures the racial 
ideological frame that the movie presents.  The vision of black equality pre-
sented as the rational political alternative, the proper compromise, and the 
ultimate aim of the great statesman is a fundamentally modern and startling-
ly conservative vision, expressed as simple legal equality.  While color-
blindness is not mentioned, the abolitionist movement and its culmination 
in the Thirteenth Amendment are reduced to a desire for the elimination of 
slavery as a legal status and little more. 
As Sandy Levinson and Jack Balkin argue, when congressional Re-
publicans drafted and debated the Thirteenth Amendment, they drew from 
the language of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 that prohibited the estab-
lishment of slavery in the territories that would eventually become Ohio, 
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.146  This language, 
adapted for the Amendment, read: “[t]here shall be neither slavery nor in-
voluntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of 
crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,” and overriding 
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Charles Sumner’s alternative proposal, which drew from the French 1791 
Declaration of Rights.147  While there was debate over what this language 
would mean, the Amendment’s author, Senators Lyman Trumbull, Jacob 
Howard, and other prominent Republicans indicated that they believed that 
the Amendment would not only end slavery, but would also establish Afri-
can American citizenship and commit the nation to enforcing equal civil 
rights under the law.148  This interpretation helps to explain Congress’s oth-
erwise puzzling passage of civil rights legislation before debating and pass-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment.  Clearly, some significant number of mem-
bers believed that the Thirteenth Amendment had granted them broad 
authority to legislate and to intervene directly against public and private 
acts of discrimination and racial repression that erupted in the South after 
the end of the war. 
In pointing out the origins of the Thirteenth Amendment’s language, 
Levinson and Balkin argue that the framers of the Amendment intentionally 
incorporated an expansive conception of what kinds of oppressive practices 
qualified as slavery.149  They therefore built into the Amendment significant 
proactive enforcement power attributed directly to Congress to ameliorate 
the effects of slavery and actively facilitate the transition of the former 
slaves to full citizenship and civic membership.150  Of course, Congress de-
bated the meaning of the Amendment, and not all members of Congress 
who voted for it held these expansive views; but the Amendment’s meaning 
was clearly more complex than simply to serve as a backstop for the Eman-
cipation Proclamation. 
In the movie, audience members are encouraged to sympathize as Lin-
coln steers Congress toward a neutered Thirteenth Amendment that does no 
more than make it impossible to re-impose slavery after the war has ended.  
The Thirteenth Amendment’s transformative potential appears only once, in 
a scene presenting a discussion between Representative Thaddeus Stevens 
and Lincoln about the fate of the emancipated slaves.  Thaddeus Stevens 
presents his vindictive vision for Reconstruction complete with full military 
occupation of the South and forty acres and a mule for each freedman, but 
Lincoln articulates a more modest plan in which the slaves are merely re-
leased from bondage, and it is Lincoln, not Stevens, who serves as the hero 
of the movie.  Later, in a dramatic scene in Congress, the radical promise of 
the Amendment is specifically disavowed by none other than Thaddeus 
Stevens himself, who says on the floor of the House that it means equality 
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before the law and nothing more.  The movie portrays Stevens as having 
opted to betray his own deeply held radical beliefs in public due to Lin-
coln’s suasion.  He is thus converted narratively into yet another voice in 
the chorus of approval for Lincoln’s centrist pragmatism.151 
By framing the battle over the Amendment solely as a location for the 
presentation of Lincoln’s political genius in forging compromise where 
none was to be found, the movie presents the Amendment in a peculiarly 
conservative light.  The Thirteenth Amendment discussed in the movie 
could readily have been cited in support of the outcome in Pace v. Ala-
bama,152 in which the Supreme Court determined that laws criminalizing 
interracial marriage were constitutional because they imposed the same 
penalties on whites and blacks.153  The movie frames the Amendment as 
unquestionably proper, presented as an antidote to the vocal and virulent 
racism of slavery’s supporters.  Its other opponent, however, was the robust 
emancipatory agenda sketched briefly by the character of Thaddeus Stevens 
and described more fully by Levinson and Balkin.154  The Amendment as 
pushed by Lincoln and passed in Congress was passive and reactive, a mere 
command to ensure that chattel slavery could not be re-imposed. 
Furthermore, this framing of the Amendment renders emancipation it-
self solely as a simple elimination of the status category of slavery.  
“Emancipation” is an empty sign in the movie; a never-defined principle 
that the good characters in the movie support.  The idea that emancipation 
could include any kind of affirmative commitment to providing freedmen 
and freedwomen with the capacity to act in the world as independent agents 
is never raised, and the Emancipation Proclamation itself is presented as a 
minimalist provision.  Ironically, if “emancipation” under the Proclamation 
meant merely the shifting of a person’s status from slave to free, it had a 
lower threshold than many southern states required for slaveowners to 
emancipate their slaves.155 
Lincoln’s rejection of Stevens’s expansive (and probably temporally 
inaccurately expressed) vision for Reconstruction also provides a compact 
argument to support contemporary discursive compromises over race is-
sues.  The movie presents a Thirteenth Amendment with which even the 
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most conservative Americans who express views on race generally accepted 
as legitimate political discourse can agree.  And perhaps that was the point. 
The movie also leaves no room to discuss the agency of blacks in end-
ing slavery: the auto-emancipees who demanded to take up arms against the 
slaveocracy, the powerful black abolitionist community led by another great 
political genius, Frederick Douglass, and the tight-knit and quietly influen-
tial class of blacks in Washington who stood so close to the corridors of 
power.156  Douglass is nowhere to be found, and the soldiers (who appear 
only momentarily at the movie’s start) and free blacks are merely props to 
cast a brighter spotlight on Lincoln himself.  Blacks are the passive benefi-
ciaries of emancipation and simply receive the benefit of his political lead-
ership, taking on no role in its achievement other than to watch it happen-
ing.  While the movie has garnered praise for its probably honest portrayal 
of Thaddeus Stevens’s intimate relationship with his mixed-race house-
keeper,157 Lydia Hamilton Smith, Smith is portrayed throughout the film as 
a feminine companion to Stevens and a witness both to Lincoln’s political 
achievement and Stevens’s betrayal of his ideals (though Stevens brings the 
amendment home to her after its passage and they tenderly read it together 
in bed).158  The movie never hints at Smith’s successful real estate business 
or her management of a boarding house; she is merely there to develop Ste-
vens’s character and, perhaps, to give him a set of romantic and personal 
reasons for supporting emancipation.159 
This image of emancipation and representation of the agency behind it 
resonates with contemporary racial politics in interesting ways.  The Lin-
colnian compromise lies between the extremes of a highly conservative po-
sition that would deny the need for any legal enforcement for principles of 
racial equality and a liberal position endorsing the continued necessity of 
race-conscious, state-enforced policies designed to generate more substan-
tive equality, like affirmative action or the continued viability of Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act.  The proper role of law is in the middle of these 
two extremes and consists in providing remedies for individualized racial 
wrongs.  It is recourse for injury, not a proactive tool to be used for the 
dismantling of institutionalized or structural racial hierarchies.  Who can 
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disagree with equality before the law, either as an aim for nineteenth centu-
ry America or for the present day? 
This vision of law replicates the perspective Reva Siegel identifies as 
an ideology of anti-classification.160  In this vision, the entire body of the 
Reconstruction amendments functions to eliminate the subordinated legal 
status of slavery and thereby render race legally illegible.161  Siegel traces 
the evolution of anti-classification to the period following Brown v. Board 
of Education162 when commentators sought to preserve the legitimacy of 
the outcome by presenting a cautious interpretation of the core principle: 
“many understood the presumption against racial classification as a strategy 
for insulating a body of constitutional law concerned with status harm in-
flicted on blacks against unremitting charges of jurisprudential illegitima-
cy.”163  The full flowering of this ideology, however, has led to its adoption 
by conservative opponents of transformative interpretations of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
In terms of presidential performances in the mold of Lincoln, the mov-
ie places the historic Abraham Lincoln as a pragmatic centrist.  It simulta-
neously situates him as a hero and advances a Thirteenth Amendment that 
would count as evidence against the legality of race-conscious or anti-
subordination legal remedies.  While it is a leitmotif and not the main 
theme, the movie can be consumed both as a national self-congratulation for 
eliminating slavery and as an argument against affirmative action. 
The stripping of black agency is significant too, as it situates African 
Americans in particular as the passive and pathetic objects of assistance 
from the Lincolnian hero.  By framing African Americans as the inert recip-
ients of emancipation, the movie both grants credit for their freedom to Lin-
coln and undermines the notion that African Americans were involved in 
asserting and defining their liberty and civic membership.  This reinforces 
old myths of black dependency, effectively separating blacks from immi-
grants, and to some extent from other racialized groups as peculiarly help-
less and in need of white agents to establish and defend their rights.164  
                                                          
 160.  Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitu-
tional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004). 
 161.  Id. at 1470–73. 
 162.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 163.  Id. at 1499. 
 164.  See generally MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND 
THE POLITICS OF ANTI-POVERTY POLICY (2000) (discussing the widespread belief that most peo-
ple receiving welfare are undeserving and the judgment that blacks’ problems stem from their own 
lack of effort); ANGE-MARIE HANCOCK, THE POLITICS OF DISGUST: THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF 
THE WELFARE QUEEN (2004) (discussing stereotypes regarding African American single mothers 
and their dependency on welfare). 
 80 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:54 
Even the reality of the massive auto-emancipation that occurred prior to the 
Emancipation Proclamation is erased.  The Proclamation is presented in a 
traditional narrative about geopolitical factors rather than as a practical so-
lution to the problem of what to do with the thousands of “escaped contra-
band” who had flooded across the combat lines to seek a new life for them-
selves. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Lincoln of the popular imagination is a laudable figure.  Former 
President Bill Clinton, David Brooks, and other admirers of the movie insist 
that much of Lincoln’s genius is its portrayal of a real and complex political 
figure rather than an icon.165  And they may be right that most Americans’ 
middle-school and high-school memories of Honest Abe would have to 
stretch significantly to incorporate a Lincoln who endorsed the distribution 
of political patronage and perhaps even bribes to achieve a desired legisla-
tive outcome.  Day-Lewis’s performance presents a more realistic picture of 
what politics was like in the Antebellum Era, and the movie may even con-
vince a few people that longing for a lost golden age of high decorum, prin-
cipled argument, and bipartisan cooperation to support shared values in 
Congress is foolish. 
But I believe that the popularity of the movie, particularly among poli-
ticians and political pundits, arises from a different source.  The movie taps 
into a culturally resonant conception of Lincoln, portraying even the graft 
he authorizes as the politically farsighted and right choice.  It also reinforc-
es a particular strand of conservative racial ideology that understands the 
civil rights movement and legal reforms of the twentieth century to have 
achieved the promise of racial equality, leaving the responsibility for re-
maining inequalities squarely on the shoulders of those experiencing them.  
There’s no question that we are meant to admire Lincoln as he argues to his 
Secretary of State, to other members of his cabinet, to his aides, and to rig-
idly principled foil Thaddeus Stevens that the end justifies the means. 
But again, the point of the movie is not, nor does the source of its pop-
ularity lie in, the real Thirteenth Amendment.  It captures and reinforces the 
zeitgeist of a moment when America perceives itself as embroiled in a new 
kind of war that demands transcendent leadership that will protect and pre-
serve the nation above all else.  The debate then shifts to what form of law-
overcoming works best. 
Consider, finally, John Yoo’s take.  The notorious author of memoran-
da justifying torture weighed in on the controversy over the Obama Admin-
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istration’s targeted killing policy, criticizing the Administration for its at-
tempt at legalization: 
 Those of us in the Bush [A]dministration who worked on the 
response to 9/11 understood that the country was involved in a 
new kind of war, one that demanded the covert use of force 
abroad, detention of terrorists at Guantánamo Bay without crimi-
nal trials, tough interrogations, and broad electronic surveillance.  
But Mr. Obama and many of those who would become his advis-
ers never fully accepted—or credited—the Bush 
[A]dministration’s difficult decision to consider 9/11 an act of 
war.166 
President Bush, in Yoo’s view, seized the nettle firmly and framed the 
conflict against al Qaeda as a war that demanded new rules of engagement 
and an abandonment both of prior practice and international law and cus-
tom.167  Yoo praised President Bush for rightfully relying on the precedent 
of the Civil War, in which “every Confederate soldier remained a U.S. citi-
zen,” but was nonetheless a legitimate target for the use of military force.168  
Neatly inverting then-Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel’s praise for President 
Obama, Yoo accused him of abandoning the clarity of war for the creation 
of a “legal fog [that] threatens to envelop U.S. soldiers and agents on the 
front lines.”169  President Bush’s clear execution of his own executive re-
sponsibilities and values, for Yoo, rendered even waterboarding justifia-
ble.170 
Ultimately, do we want a president who, like Julius Caesar, “doth be-
stride the narrow world/Like a Colossus, and we petty men/Walk under his 
huge legs and peep about?”171  And are we willing to live with a neutered 
Thirteenth Amendment that did nothing more than render slavery illegal?  I 
ask these questions being well aware that Americans who criticize the hagi-
ographic view of Lincoln are approximately as popular as Cassius.  But by 
celebrating an image of Lincoln who uses the tools of political mastery in 
moments of crisis—disunion, slavery, al Qaeda, or some other threat the 
President alone believes is of sufficient gravity—to justify whatever the 
President believes is necessary, we embrace a dangerous dream. 
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